#### Outbreak Investigation of Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococcus faecium in a City Hospital — Shizuoka, Japan, 2022 Resistance Resistance Research Center NUID

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## Background:

- Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) are an antimicrobial-resistant (AMR) pathogen on the WHO global priority pathogens list for research and are one of the target AMR pathogens for control and prevention.
- The frequency of vancomycin resistance in Enterococci has remained low in Japan (Fig. 1), with few examples of coordinated responses to its outbreaks.
- A city hospital in Shizuoka, Japan, experienced a VRE outbreak in 2022, and we conducted a joint investigation with the hospital's infection control team (ICT), a local public health center, a local public health institute, and local and national experts.
- This report describes how we are controlling the VRE outbreak in the city

Fig. 1. Number of reported VRE infection cases<sup>\*1</sup> in Japan, 2021 (n=124)<sup>\*2</sup>



hospital through the coordinated response among multiple stakeholders.

# Methods:

- Study design: cross-sectional study.
- Case definition: a patient testing positive for vancomycin-resistant *E. faecium* (VREfm, *E. faecium* with a minimum inhibitory concentration [MIC] of vancomycin  $\geq 16 \ \mu g/mL$ ) by samples obtained during hospitalization between 1 October 2020 and 17 October 2022. Cases in which VREfm was detected 3 days or more after admission were defined as nosocomial infection.
- Information sources: bacterial culture, screening criteria, patient chart, interview with healthcare workers, inspection in the affected wards via investigation with multiple stakeholders, and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE).

# **Results**:

- There were 160 cases in total (Fig. 2) from 8 of 9 wards (13 of 24) departments), with 116 cases (73%) occurring in 2 wards (6 East and 6 West) (Fig. 2, Table 1).
- Transmission possibly due to suboptimal hand hygiene during diaper changes was suggested with a high proportion of cases among patients with low activities of daily living (76%).
- All VREfm isolates tested were within 6 band differences by PFGE.
- The hospital then launched monthly screening cultures for all hospitalized

infection. VRE was defined as *Enterococcus* species with their MIC

idwr/nenpou/11638-syulist2021.html)

#### Fig. 2. Epidemic curve of the VRE outbreak in a city hospital, Shizuoka, Japan,





Table 1. Basic characteristics of the cases in the VRE outbreak in a city hospital,

patients, strengthened standard precautions including hand hygiene, strengthened contact precautions, avoided re-use or sharing of patient care materials, and enhanced information sharing among staff and neighboring hospitals.

Joint investigation encouraged active communication between the hospital, the local public health center, the local public health laboratory, and local and national experts, and control measures were implemented under their consultation.

### Conclusion:

This large-scale, long-standing nosocomial outbreak of VREfm responded to by multiple stakeholders including the hospital ICT, local public health center and local experts, and national experts can be a model for controlling the spread of AMR pathogens (Fig. 3).





Shizuoka, Japan, 1 Oct 2020 – 17 Oct 2022, n=160

	n	%		n	%	
Male sex	109	68%	Specimen			
Median age, yo (range)	79 (32-103)		Stool	154	96%	
ADL			Ascites	1	1%	
Independent	36	23%	Urine	2	1%	
Dependent	122	76%	Bile	1	1%	
(toilet assistance, etc.)			Pus/abdominal abscess	2	1%	
Other <sup>*1</sup>	2	1%	Intervention and care <sup>*4</sup>			
VRE infection <sup>*2</sup>	5	3%	Endoscopy	41	25%	
Death <sup>*3</sup>	30	19%	Enteral feeding	2	1%	
Nosocomial transfection	146	91%	Central venous catheter	11	7%	
Ward on sampling day			Antimicrobial use	133	83%	
6 East	72	45%	Median days between	10 (0-108)		
6 West	44	28%	admission and VRE			
5 East	1	1%	detection (range)			
5 West	8	5%	Patient moves to different	: ward(s) <sup>*5</sup>		
4 West	5	3%	0	108	68%	
3 East	3	2%	1	34	22%	
3 West	26	16%	2	8	5%	
ICU	1	1%	3 or more	8	5%	

\*1 Need for assistance with stoma care.

\*<sup>2</sup> Small bowel perforation, septic shock, cholangiocarcinoma, cholecystitis, urinary tract infection.

\*<sup>3</sup> No deaths were clearly thought to be due to VRE.

\*<sup>4</sup> Between admission and VRE detection.

\*<sup>5</sup> Excluding 2 cases with unknown history.

We gratefully acknowledge support of the local government of Shizuoka prefecture, the public health center, and the local Institute of Environment and Hygiene.