

Investigation of a COVID-19 Cluster in the Basement of a Local Hospital in Singapore from 30 August to 16 September 2021

Santhya M¹, Seow Yen TAN^{2,3}, Steven Peng Lim OOI^{3,4,5}, Matthias Paul Han Sim TOH^{1,5}

¹ National Public Health and Epidemiology Unit, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Singapore (NPHEU, NCID)

² Department of Infectious Diseases, Changi General Hospital, Singapore (CGH)

³ Infectious Diseases Research & Training Office, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Singapore (IDRTO, NCID)


⁴ Executive Director's Office, National Centre for Infectious Diseases, Singapore (EDO, NCID)

⁵ Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore, Singapore (SSHSPH, NUS)

Background

- Primary case of the cluster developed symptoms on **30 August 2021**. (Figure 1)
- Symptom onset in **72%** of secondary cases occurred from **1 – 3 September**.
- Subsequent sporadic cases were identified **till 16 September**. (Figure 1)
- Of the **57** staff in this cluster, **6** did not work in the basement
 - Visited the basement or had social interactions with staff who worked there.
- All staff were **fully vaccinated** at the time of investigation.

Figure 1. Epidemic Curve showing onset of illness in CGH Staff with epidemiological and phylogenetic linkage (n=57)



Methods

- Site visit** conducted to identify risk factors of transmission
- CCTV footage** from the corridors and staff clock in/clock out areas was **reviewed**.
- Interviews conducted** with selected staff to understand
 - Staff movements
 - Type & nature of interactions
 - Staff activities surrounding the time of the outbreak.
- Further details were obtained with assistance provided by in-house staff.


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- Staff of CGH

Results

- 58%** of those affected were **outsourced maintenance staff**
 - Substantial **time spent in common areas** such as workshop, rest area and male toilet likely caused **propagation of infection**
 - Household transmission** was also likely as some staff lived together across 6 households in rented apartments
- Transmission to other areas in the basement
 - Visits by maintenance staff
 - Poor ventilation** in basement
 - Lack of safe distancing**
 - Unmasked interactions** in crowded common areas
- 32 phylogenetically sequenced cases belonged to the **same parent node**, supporting findings from the investigation. (Figure 2)

Figure 2. Part of the phylogenetic tree showcasing selected cases from the cluster that were sequenced



Conclusion

- Air and droplet, fomite and multiple mode exposures** accounted for the transmission of infection within this cluster
- Poor ventilation** facilitated rapid spreading of infection

Recommendations

- Air handling unit (AHU) filters and exhaust mechanisms **upgraded to improve ventilation**
- Increased disinfection** of common areas daily
- Non-touch** clock in/clock out points introduced
- Split team arrangements** to access high traffic points
- Improved **education**
- Enforcement of **infection prevention and control measures**
- Staff to be up-to-date on **COVID-19 vaccination**